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Nastygram
Federalism:
A Look at
Federal Environmental
Self-Audit Policy
By Davrd N.CUSSU~O"

+
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lmag~nethat a company conducts a voluntary environmental audit. As a result of that audit the company
learns it is In violation of the law. It reports the v~olation
to the authorities and brings its operat~oninto compliance. Should the company face a governmental enforcement action?
This is not an easy question, Absolving the company
of liability would arguably reward it. not lust for its honesty, but for its violation as well. It would reap the economic benefit of its noncompliance with environmental
regulations and suffer no penalty when the v~olat~on
is
revealed. On the other hand, pun~sh~ng
the company
carr1e.s its own potentially serious drawbacks. Vigorously
prosecuting a regulated entity for admitting and correcting its error could pose a s~gnificantdeterrent to any
future self-polic~ngby the regulated community.
The federal government, in the gulse of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency), has
sought the middle ground on t h ~ sIssue. The Agency's
stated policy encourages self-audits without ceding its
enforcement power EPA enumerated its policy In two
successive guidance documents released In 1995 (with
the second one superceding the first).In both its lnterim
Policy Statement! (issued April 3. 1995)and Final Policy
Statemehtz (issued December 22, 19951, the Agency
offered varlous rncentives to lndustnes to spur them to
self-audit, including reduung economic penalties and
not recommending cr~minalprosecutlon.3
Nineteen states have gone further. enacting laws
granting varlous degrees of privilege to audit results
6
Davrd N Cassuto received hrs I D from the Un~versityof
Califomla. 6oalt Hall School of Law In 1998 He currently clerks for
the HonhRosemary Barkett on the United States Court of Appeals
N C LITERANRE+ P o r n &
for the 1 I th Circuit. His k k , D R ~ ~ DRY
WATER
IN THE D E S E R T W
IS forthcoming
~ ~
from the Unrversity of
Michigan Press. The author would like to thank Arthur Haubenstock
and john W e r for therr aid and adv~cewith thls project.
1. i'oluntary Environmental Self-Poliung and Self-Disclosure
lnterim Policy Statement. 60 Fed Reg 16,875 f 19951 lherernafter
Interim Policy Statement]
2. lncentlves for Self-Policing. Dlscovery, Disclosure.
Correction and Preventlon of V~olatlons,60 Fed. Reg 66,706 119951
lhereinafter Final Policy Statementl
3. EPKs position presented a srgnificant departure from its
previous stance, whlch was 'EPA will not prornlse to forego Inspections. reduce enforcement responses, or offer other such Incentives
In exchange for Implementation of environmental auditlng or other
sound environmental management practices" United States
Environmental Protection Ageng Envrronrnental Auditing Policy
Statement, 51 Fed Reg 25.004.25.007 (1986)

Heinonline

--

5 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L.

&

Pol'y 261 1998-1999

3s

I

s

31

~ovidN. ~msuto

Volume 5, NU&

3

and in some cases giving Immunity to the violator? States with prlvilege and Immunity laws
clalm that in order to provide industry with an
adequate Incentive to self-police, the government must offersufficient guarantees that they
will not prosecute violators who disclose and
remediate on the~rown initlatlve. Proponents
of the state initiatives label the federal policy a
"seek and ye shall be fined" approach to environmental management.
In states with privilege laws, regulated
entities can refuse to disclose regulatory violations discovered during voluntary self-audits
as long as they correct the vlolat~onswithln a
statutorily designated time period. States with
immunity reglmes disallow penalties for vlolat~onsthat are discovered through internal selfaudits and then corrected voluntarily.
EPA strongly opposed the majority of state
initiatives, arguing that many prlvilege and
immunity statutes curtail the public's right to
know, interfere with the government's enforcement capability, foster litigation, and give an
unfair advantage to violators over those who

comply with environmental laws.5 Nevertheless, neither the Interim Policy nor the Final
Policy Statement enumerate? EPA':; likely reaction to state-created audit protections." To
date, the Agency's responses have ranged from
silence to threats to revoke states' authority to
~mplementfederal envlronmental laws (as diagrammed in State Implementation Plans, or
"SIPsU).7Most debates have ended in compromise.
The varying state and federal policles
result from different judgments about how
best to enforce envlronmental laws. EPA maintains that companies already have adequate
incentive to self-audit, that EPP, policy provides further incentive, and that fear of govern*
mental enforcement 1s not the prlmary factor
deterring companies from instituting self-audit
programs.8 The Agency further argues that
additional incentives (i.e., state privilege
and/or immunity statutes) undermine the delicate competitive balance among regulated
entities.9 It reasons that entitles reslding in
states with privilege and/or Immunity statutes

4. States with some form of self-audit laws include:
Arkansas. Colorado, Idaho. Illinois. Indiana. Kansas.
Kentucky. Michigan, Minnesota. Mississippi, New
Hampshire. New Jersey, Oregon. South Carolina. South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virglnla and Wyomlng. For a capsule
discussion of each state's policy, see ELIZABETH
GLASS
GELTMAN,
A COMPLETE
GUIDE
TO ENVIRONMENTAL
AUDITS21 158 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Memorandum from Steven A. Herman,
Asslstant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, EPA and Mary Nichols, Office of
Air G Radiation, to JacksonFox. Regional Counsel. Region
X (Apr. 5. 1996). Re: "Effect of Audit Immunity/Privilege
Laws on States' Ability to Enforce Title V Requnements"
lhereinafter "Memorandum from Steven Herman"] ("EPA
has consistently opposed blanket amnesties which
excuse repeated noncompliance, cnminal conduct. or
violations that result In serious harm or risk, as well as
audit prlvileges that shield evidence of violations from
regulators and jeopardize the public's right-to-know
about noncompliance.");see also David A. Dana. The Perverse
Incentives of Envrronmental Audit Immunity, 81 IOWA L. REV.
969. 975-76 (1996) (arguing that immunity statutes serve
more as hazard management than hazard prevention.
since offering Immunity for past wrongs provldes no
incentive not to violate In the future).
6. The lntenm Policy Statement however, does suggest, without elaboration, that the EPA will helghten its
scrutiny of envlronmental programs in states that have

passed laws protecting audit results. Interim Pollcy
Statement. supra note 1, at 16.878. 'The Final Pollcy
Statement, in addition to outlining EPA's firm opposition
to statutory envlronmental audit prlvileges and immunlties, declares the agency's willingness ti1 work with states
to address any provlslons of state laws that are inconsistent with the federal policy. See Final Policy Statement,
supra note 2, at 66,712.
7 See Lynn L. Bergeson & Llsa M. Campbell, The
Debate Over Envrronmental Auditing. THEWASHINGTON
LAWYER.
SeptJOct. 1997,at 43 ("AlthoughEPA has made threats In
various states. no state, to date, has been deprived of delegated authority as a result of Its environmental audit
pnvilege provlslons.").
8. Sec Commercral and Adm~natrativeLaw Proltclion of
Envrronmental Self-Evaluation Data: Heantla Before the Comm
on the Judicrary, 104th Cong. (June29 10951 (statement of
Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. U.S EPA)
lhereinaker "Testimony of Steven Herman"1 Indeed. the
agency maintains that a strong enforcement mechanism
provldes a necessary Incentive for lntlustries to participate In voluntary compliance programs. Brian Riedel.
U.S. EPA, Vice Chair (Office of Planning and Pollcy
Analysis), Office of Enforcement and Compliance,
Address to Russian delegation, San 1:rancisco (June 20,
1997).
9. See Testimony of Steven Herman, supra note 8
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galn a competitive advantage over those residIng elsewhere. In addit~on,even withln states
with such statutes, entitles willing to bend the
rules will galn over those choosing to comply
strlctly with the law.10
Supporters of the state laws present a different scenario. They argue that encouraging
companles to self-audit leads to greater environmental compliance and mlnlmlzes business
uncertainties. Additionally, proponents maintam, uslng the results of an audit that was voluntarily conducted and disclosed to penalize
the auditor deters voluntary compliance and
casts a pall over the buslness climate.11
The resulting conflict between EPA and the
states has generated a flurry of "nastygrams"
sent by the Agency to varlous states,l2 threatenIng to suspend or withhold a state's ability to
Implement federal pollut~onlaws.13 In other
cases, EPA has s~mplyasked for clarification
and assurance from the states that the~raudit
laws would not interfere with the~renforcement
capability.14
Thls Article examlnes the evolut~onof EPA's
audit policy, explores the reasons for states' dissatisfaction with it, and then discusses whether
the federal policy should have been issued as a
rule under the Admin~strativeProcedure Act
(APA).15 Part I examines the evolut~onof the
federal audit policy and then analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of the policy tn its

current form Part I1 explores varlous types of
ev~dentiaryprlvilege and looks at the arguments
for and against extending the pr~vilegeto audit
reports. It then offers a s~milaranalysis of the
case for limited immunity, concluding that neither an expanded prrvilege nor Immunity IS necessary to encourage compliance audits, and
that both provisions can senously undermine
the public's right to know andstheAgencys law
enforcement abilities Part I11 clarifies the distinction between policies and rules under the
APA in order t~ determ~newhether EPA's audit
policy 1s actually a rule In disguise
The Article concludes that the federal audit
policy offers suffic~ententicements to 1ndustt-y
to self-audit The overall goal of both the state
and federal pglic~esshould be heightened compliance with envlr~nmenta! Eaws Yet, state
statutes bedeck the audit process with tncentives to the pant where companles potent~aIIy
could gain more by auditing than through cornplylng w~ththe law Such laws treat audits as an
end in themselves This is a dangerous trend
Business uncerta~ntlesconcerning the lnterpretatlon and impact of environmental laws shoutd
be allayed through compliance rather than
through audits alone The federa! audit policy,
unadorned by prlvilege or tmrnunity clauses,
d ~ e not
s hallow audits. but offers ~ n t ylimited
Incentives as part of an ~verallpeticy of encouraging lawful behavior

10. See 1995 Minn. Law 168 $0 8. 10.
11. See, e.g.. State Official Promotes Flexibility of
Pennsylvanta Self-AuditPlan, Buslness Publishers, Inc., Solid
Waste Report, April 4. 1996, awitabk m LEXIS. Environ
Library (discussing the head of Pennsylvania's
Department of Env~ronmentalProtection's support for the
state's plan to refram from penalizing companles that discover v~olationsdunng compliance audits); Letter from
Richard Graves. Flonda Chamber of Commerce, to the
editors, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES,
April 6. 1996. availnbk t n
LEXIS. Nexls Library. Cumnews file (argulngthat Florida's
self-audit leg~slationis "known as the 'Find It, Fix It' bill
because that's prec~selywhat it encourages the finding
and fixlng of small environmental problems before they
become big ones"); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Patenlially
Perverse Effectsof Corporate Cnmtnal Ltability. 23 1. LEGALSTUD
833, 833-37 (1994) (discussing how liability for vlolat~ons
found through Internal auditing will reduce audit~ng
rather than violations).

setve ncat~cethat the EPA wauIrl f r ~ x nan pnnilege an3
Immunlv legislatran enacted b; the stxes St Envir~.
Audib~gEPA Oppos~lronQuekk~j9 m S t~~ tBilk
t Greew81re
June 12, 1906, avarlable rn LEXIS, Envrron Crbwry
13 Same supporters ef the state Inrtrseves have
sc~ffedat EPXs threat, csPl~ngLC ' h s ! [ ~ Isrnes
x
0 ReiII;..
corporate caarnseh fer Pr~ctorE G3rnbTe rernsrked thst rn
light af federal budget reatttres "EPA pmbabIy ~ u l be
d
unable tooperate acsrnplex permtttrng pragmm tbrangh
~ t regional
s
offices EPA Sags State lmmunrly Pnr~kgth ~ ;
May Undcrmrne Atr Act Enjontmunt Pd~lrs Daily
Environment Repsner Aprrl 15 19%. P V J I ? J &la~ LEXI3,
Envlrsn L~braryFar 6nfsmatron regarding EPAs strategc
use of Inspeaton resources U S EPA Enfoxamtnt m tk
1990s Pn;eil4-59 to 4-63 I I%!)

12. States recemng nastygrarns include California,
Colorado and Idaho. The nastygrarns seemed designed to
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Perhaps even more ~mportantly,a rule
mandat~ngan adm~n~strat~ve
enforcement procedure would create far more problems than it
would solve. Agenc~eshave enormous discret ~ o nover when to Institute enforcement
act~ons.That discretion IS both court-defined
and salutary.16 Agencles are far better
equ~ppedthan the courts to declde when and
how to expend thelr enforcement resources.17
A rule sett~ngout the requlrements for enforcement act~onswould obligate the Agency to
meet those requ~rements when dec~ding
whether or not to enforce. Addit~onally,it
would create the potentlal for boundless lit~gatlon because defendants could lit~gateevery
facet of the rule's enforcement prerequ~sites.
The federal audit policy also does not
appear to be a camouflaged rule wh~chshould
have undergone a rulemak~ngIn accordance
with the APA.18 Neither the APA, nor the courts,
have created a definitive test for different~at~ng
polic~esfrom rules. Therefore, it IS difficult to
state with certa~ntythat the audit policy should
not be subject to a rulemak~ng.Nevertheless,
the policy survlves both a Force of Law and a
Substantla1 Impacts analys1s.19the two extant
ludicla1 tests for determ~n~ng
whether a policy
IS actually a rule In disgu~se.
Recently, EPA has
also demonstrated a growlng sensit~vityto the
polic~es from rules.
nuances different~at~ng
Considered In the aggregate, these factors
make a strong case that the audit policy need
not undergo a rulemak~ng procedure, nor
should it.

16. See Heckler v. Chaney. 470 U.S. 82 1. 83 1 ( 1985)
["Th~sCourt has recognized on several occasions over
many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or
enforce, whether through civil or crlmlnal process, IS a
decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion."].
17. See ld.
18. See 5 U.S.C. g 553 (b) (1994).
19. See Aman & Mayton, lnfra note 93qand accompanylng text.
20. Interim Policy Statement, supra note 1, at
16,877
21. lndustr~esmay institute numerous other meth-
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11. Development of EPA's Environmental

Audit Policy
EPA defines an env~ronmenialaudit as "a
systemat~c,documented, perloclic and oblect~verevlew by regulated entitles of facility
operat~onsand pract~cesrelated to meet~ng
env~ronmentalrequ1rements."*0Audits constltute one facet of a larger environmental management scheme,21 offerlng periodic, or occas~onal~nspect~ons
des~gnedto Identify ex~stIng areas of noncompliance end facilitate
the~rcorrection. Audits can alscl help locate
areas of employee noncompliance, thereby
encouraging Increased attentlveness among
the rank and file.
In theory, self-audits reduce bus~ness
fears and enhance government monitor~ng
capabilities by enlisting the alcl of the regulated entitles themselves. The Agency galns
because it can husband its th~nlystretched
enforcement resources. Regulated enti tles
benefit because they can cat,:h v~olat~ons
before they become too serlous (and sometimes before they even occur),thereby sparing
themselves potentially severe penalties The
public benefits because Increased compliance
with env~ronmentallaws br~ngsaccompanylng Improvements In public health and the
environment. And last, companies already In
compliance galn through the establishment of
a level play~ngfield In whlch to do bus~ness.
Though EPA Issued its first authoritat~ve
policy on envlronmental audits In 198b,iZ
industries have long recognized that voluntary compliance audits often serve the~rbest
ods for ensurlng env~ronmentalcompliance The dr,tft
federal sentencing guidelines for corporate envirorrmental crimes suggest, among other tactlcs, contlnuolls onsite monitoring, by specifically trained compliance pcrsonnel and by other means." as well as regular arid ongolng employee trainlng and Incentives Advisory Croup on
Environmental Sanctions, U S Senttnclng Cornrn'n,
Env~ronmentalGu~delinesfor Oraan~zalions.3 9Dl I (a)(7)(iii)
(Nov, 16, 1973 Draft), reprinted In Oraanlz~nafor Corparale
Compliance: Toward Standards, Cl I0 ALI-ABA 287, 702-03
(Mar. 1995);see also Dana. supra note 5 at (575 G n 27
22. Env~ronmentalAuditing Policy Statement. T I
Fed. Reg. 25.1104 ( 1986) The Agency did. however, publish
an interim policy statement In November, 1985 Scr 50
Fed. Reg. 46.504 ( 1985)
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1nterests.23Auditsprov~deIndustry with an early
warnlng system through whlch to detect exlstIng and potentla1 env~ronmentalv~olations.
Managers can Identify and remediate lnclplent
problems, mlnlmlzlng env~ronmental~mpacts.
and reduclng the probability of clvil or cr~mlnal
enforcement actlons. They can also redes~gn
overs~ghtand management systems to avo~d
future v~olat~ons.
In addit~on,audits can play an
Important role In avo~dingcitizen suits by provlding informat~onthat goes beyond mere compliance data concerning nonregulatory envrronmental, health and safety problems.24
In EPA's 1986 audit policy, the Agency
sought to encourage envlronmental self-audits
and stated that it would not routinely request
coples of the audit reports.25 It also Indicated
that facilities with self-audit systems In place
would be subled to fewer 1nspectlons.26While
the 1986 policy demonstrated the Agency's preference that facilit~esconduct self-audits, a s ~ d e
from its unquantified promlse of "fewer Inspect~ons,"however, it offered little In the way of
tangible encouragement to do so. In effect, the
Agency asked regulated entitles that elected t~
self-audit to s~mplytrust that the audit results
would not be used agalnst them.
Though EPA stated that it would not routlnely demand coples of audit reports, it
reserved the rlght to request them whenever
necessary.27 Furthermore, despite its stated
preference for self-audits, EPA declined to alter
its enforcement response based on whether a
facility self-audited.28 In short, though the 1986
policy defined a clear Agency preference and
h~ntedat Agency cooperation, it failed to make
self-audit~ngsufficiently attractlve to regulated
entities.29 Because it did not create explicit
Agency gu~delines,the policy did not prov~de
companies with any degree of certa~ntywhile
23. Sez Terrell Hunt G Timothy \?rllk~ns,
EnmronmentalAudits and Et~forcetnct~t
Policy, 16 HaF?: E~J:TLL
REV.365,371 (1992).
24. See id.
25. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement,
5 1 Fed. Reg. at 25.007.
26. See ~ d .

leavlng them exposed to substant~afenforcement actlons
A. The lntenm Policy
In 1995. EPA announced a new, lnterrm

Policy des~gnedto provtde rncentlves for enttties to self-audit Compan~esthat self-audited
and met certaln conditmns would enpy
reduced civil penalties and a commitment from
the Agency not to refer the case to the
Department of lust~cefor cr~rnlnalprosecution C~nditlonsFor lessened Agency response
Included-

"

1 lbluntary seEf-polic~ng-regulated
entity must discover the violatton
through a voluntary audit or self-evaluatlon rather than through statutory
~bligatlon
2 Voluntary disclosure-entity must
disclose the vlolatlon to the approprtate state and federal agencies as soon
as ~tIS discovered
3 Prompt correct~on-vrofatt~n must
be carrected withln slxty days or, if more
tlme 1s needed. as expeditiorrsEy as possible
4 Remediatlon ef m-~mtnentand substant~alendangerment-entrty must
promptly remediate any csnditron
whlch may cause trnrnrnent and substantlal h a m to humans ar the envrronment
5 Remediatlon sf h a m and preuentlon of repeat vtolatmesss
6. No lack of appmprtate preventive
measures-vralatron cannot rndicate
that entlty failed to take approprrate
steps to avo~drepeat or recunrng vrolatlons
29 Sn 03':d S;7rens3n C ~ m r n e n t Tht U S
Etlnntrn:tnrrll Pa!sr~,ri!
,%7<1li0.
Et~tnIEniir~c~nmtn!~I
,+ull~ti~~
Pday al:.i PJ:L~II!~.I!
CIT~!!;~:I
bilk SWIc-Crzd!d Enr~ronrncnr~i
Audrt Prrrikgc Lar. Q T , , E'.'.TL L I 453 4% 1 Epcrujl, j<<of.j~,
Hunt 6 \l:tiik~ns srrrw nile 23 st. 3 6 4 G Van Velsor \VJYJ,
Is SIf-AudiI Pniiltll? ael D;:;t:urt 3 3 1 % All-AB?. 531 543
( l(i961

27. See id.

30
16.875

28. See id.

31
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7 Cooperat~on-entitymust cooperate a s requ~redby EPA and prov~de
such lnformatlon a s IS necessary to
determine applicability of the policy.32

The reduced clvil penalt~esIncluded EPA's
commitment t o seek recovery of only the economlc benefit gamed through noncompliance33 rather than "gravity-based" penaltles34
from entitles whlch met all the requlrements
set forth In the policy.35 The Agency further
agreed to lessen gravity-based penalties by 75
percent In cases where most but not all of the
conditions are met.36
The lnter~mPolicy expressed EPA's strong
opposition to state statutes grantlng varlous
forms of Immunity t o entitles performing selfaudits and/or prlvileglng the results of those
audits.37 In the Agency's vlew, such privileges
and lmmunitles, "could be used t o shleld cnmlnal misconduct, drlve up litlgatlon costs and
create an atmosphere of distrust between regulators, Industry, and local communit1es."38 In
addition, EPA maintamed that, slnce the prlnclpal rationale for self-audit statutes lay In limitlng the exposure of entitles that conduct selfaudits and act on thelr findings, and slnce the
lnterlm Policy addressed these concerns, state
self-audit statutes that exceeded EPA's policy

33. See lnterlm Policy Statement, supra note 1, at
16,877 The agency's purpose In recovering economlc ben-

efits was to "preserve a level playlng field In whtch v~olators do not galn a competitive advantage through noncompliance." Id.
34. Gravity-based penalties are those that exceed
the amount necessary to recover any economlc benefit
the violator m~ghthave reaped as a result of the violation.
See Sorenson. supra note 29 at n.25.
35. The potential savlngs to the regulated entity
arlslng from its escaplng gravity-based penalties can be
substantial. For example, GTE Corporation recently disclosed and resolved 600 violations at 314 facilities In 21
states. The settlement between GTE and EPA requlres the
company to pay a $52,264 penalty tntended to offset the
economlc galn acqutred through noncompliance.
Because GTE disclosed and remediated according to the
audit policy, however, EPA watved another $2.8 million In
gravity-based penalties. See "GTE Corrects 600 Violations
Through EPA's Self-Disclosure Policy," A U DPOLICY
~ UPDATE,
UNITEDSTATES
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
VOLUME3
No. 1, Mar. 1998 (on file with author).

Heinonline

--

served only t o hlnder enforcement efforts.39
Consequently, the Agency stated its lntent~on
t o "scrutlnlze enforcement more closely" In
states with self-audit statutes ancl t o Increase
federal enforcement where the Agency
believed the statutes Interfered with a state's
ability t o meet federal requlrements for
enforcement and protecting the citlzenry.40
B. The Final Policy

EPA Invited response t o the lr~terlmpolicy
from the public, Industry, pukllic Interest
groups and state offic~als.~'
In December, 1995,
the Agency released its final policy statement.42 Among lndustrys chlef concerns with
the lnterlm Policy had been the pa3rametersof
"voluntary" reports and "voluntary" audits.43 It
was not clear, for example, whethzr vrolatrons
discovered as part of an entity's due diligence
qualified for penalty mitlgatlon. The Final
Policy Statement attempted to address rndustry complaints by clarifying the definition of
voluntary disclosure and statlng that certaln
monitoring efforts, whlch were zrguably not
"voluntary," ~ncludingan entity's due diligence.
would not per s e disqualify an entity from
penalty mitlgat1on.~4 The Final Policy
Statement also clarified the requlrements for
walver or dimlnutlon of gravity-based penal36.
16.877
37
38.

See lntertm Policy Statement, supra note I , at
See rd. at 16,878.
Id.

39. See rd. The lnterlm Policy Statement argued that
granting additional privileges and lmmunity to self-audltors would undermine efforts to open up environmental
decistonmaking to public scrutiny, shield bad actors and
conceal crucial information and Increase litlgatlon as
opposing sides battled over what was and was not privileged or Immune
40. See rd; see also, Enforcement: Lowr 1'tnaltb Seen EU
Enforcement Chief Under Upcomlng EPA Policy on Cornpanu
Audits, 25 ENV'T
REP (BNA) 2379 (Mar 3 1. 1995).
41.
16,875.

See Inter~mPolicy Statement, srrpra note I , at

42.
66.706.

See Final Policy Statement. supra note 2, at

43.
44.
66,708.

See Wolf. supra note 29 at 543.
See Final Policy Statement, sullra note 2, at
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refining the language of the lnter~mPolicy
and In the process expanding the list of prerequisites from seven to nlne:

The Final Policy Statement also declares
that EPA will not recommend cases for crrm1nal prosecutlon if v~olatorsmeet the nlne
requ~rementslisted above, and the~rmanage1. Violat~onmust have been discovment does not show a conscious involvement
with, or willful blindness to, the violat1ons.47
ered pursuant to an env~ronmental
audit or other systematic procedure.
And. as with the lnter~mPolicy. the Agency
2. Regulated entity must have discovdeclared that it would not routinely request or
ered the v~olatlon voluntarily-not
use audit reports to tnit~ate~nvest~gations,
through a legally mandated monitorlng
though it reserved the r~ghtto request the
program.
reports if it galns Independent knowledge of a
3. The entity must disclose v~olat~ons
v~olat~on.~V
forf , example. EPA learned
with~nten days of its discovery.
through a t ~ pfrom a company employee or
4. D~sclosure must precede any
through some other form of monitorlng that a
company that had recently completed an audit
Agency actlon or cit~zensuit.
5 Entity must correct the v~olation
was out of compliance. the Agency could
within sixty days or notify the Agency
request the audit results as part of its enforceIn writ~ngas to why it will take longer.
ment effort.
6. Entity must agree In writlng to
Though the Final Policy Statement elimiInstitute measures to prevent recurnates much of the uncerta~ntyand confusron
rence.
arrstng from the lnter~mPolicy, critics compla~n
7 Same or srmilar v~olationcannot
that several cruc~alIssues remaln unresolved
have occurred at the facility withln the
and that the Final Policy Statement fails to prolast three years, nor can it be part of a
v~deany s~gnificantrelief t~ regulated lnduspattern of v~olatronsby parent organltrIes4' First. the line between gravity-based
zation over prevlous five years.
penalt~es(the punitive portlon of the finej and
8. Violat~onmust not have resulted In
recovery of any economlc benefit reaped from
serious harm or Imminent and sub(the "level playlng field" compothe v~olat~on
stant~al endangerment to human
nent) IS far from clear- Second. though €PA
health or the envlronment, nor can it
declares that it may decline to seek any recovhave v~olatedthe terms of any ludic~al
ery where the economlc galn IS "inslgnificant,"
order or consent agreement.
it does not specify what "inslgnificant amount"
9 Entity must cooperate with EPA by
means.50
prov~dinginformat~orfand access to
Thlrd. perhaps the most s~gnificantflaw rn
empl0yees.~5
the Final Policy Statement. according to one
commentator. lies In its failure to elaborate
If an entity does not discover the v~olat~on how entitles that self-audit would be protected
through an audit or s~milarprocedure, but sat- from th~rd-partysuits. If an entity self-audits
~sfiesthe remalnlng criteria, EPA will reduce and discloses the ~nformation,~tcould then face
gravity-based penalt~esby 75 percent.&
exposure to toxlc tort suits or. In a more likely
ties,

45. Id. at 66.712.
46. See id. at 66.711. The language concernlng
reduc~nggravity-based penalties represented a substantial improvement In clarity from the interim Policy
Statement. Whereas the Final Policy stated that the
penalties would be reduced 75 percent if the entity satisfied conditions 2-9, the intenm Policy had s a ~ dthat penalties may be reduced "upto" 75 percent where 'mostq conditions were met. Id. at 66.707.
47. See Id.
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49 Srr, e g N'olf. supra note 29, at 545. Clinton E
Elliott, Kentucfiys Enr~ronmtntaISpy-Aud11 Pnvlftqt Staft
Protcctlon or Inzrwsd Fdtral Scmt1ny723 N KY L RE: I , I2
IlW5); Ronald E Cardwell, Sdf-Aud~tAct An lnrentrw for
\'aluntary Cnmp!lrlnce? 8-0ct S C Law 38, 41-42 L 1996g;
50 SrrtV~lf,supm note 29 at 545 An agency source
who w~shesto rernaln anonymous notes. however, that
"six flgures IS a g a d rule of thumb
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Dovid N. Caauto
to potentially devastating citlzen
enforcement suits filed by public Interest
groups.51 Suits in tort requlre a showing of harm
and accompanying proof of causat~on.But probative showings of harm and causation are
often difficult, especially because not all violations result In harm and even when they do, it IS
often difficult to link conclus~velythe violatlon
to the harm. Citizen enforcement suits, by contrast, requlre no such showlng of harm; the only
harm they need to prove IS the existence of the
vlolation itself.52 Consequently, the specter of
such suits, whlch often call for clvil penalt~es
and attorney's fees, as well as requlrlng a costly
defense, can be soberlng to a company consldering a voluntary compliance audit.
First, the Final Policy Statement declines to
specify EPA's methodology for determining economlc benefit for a glven v~olat~on.
Generally,
however, the Agency utilizes the BEN model for
determlnlng economic benefit.53 While EPA
does not specify whether it Intends to apply
s , ~seems
~
a
BEN to all laws and v ~ o l a t ~ o nthls
minor problem and one that IS easily remedied
either through querylng the Audit Policy Qulck
Response Team (QRT)55or durlng the Agency's
follow-up studies.56
The second critlclsm IS of the Agency's failure to specify the preclse amount of economic
benefit that would spur the Agency to attempt
recovery and IS even less valid. Entitles audit to

correct exrstlng and potentlal vlolations, head
off enforcement measures, and nwwnlze the
rlsk of accident, injury, costly litiga1:lon and bad
public relations. If an entity decides not to selfaudit out of concern that EPA will seek to recover economic benefits, two likely conclus~onscan
be extrapolated: ( I ) the entity has committed a
violatlon that has brought it a elzable illicit
return (otherwise the specter of loslng those
benefits would not offer cause for c~ncern);
and
(2) since minor compliance vlolaticns are rarely
the source of large ill-gotten galns, the vlolation
or violations were likely of a seriou.; nature.
Given the probable seriousness of the transgressions, the gravity-based penalt~esarislng
from an Agency enforcement actlon could greatly outwelgh any economlc benefit gamed
through the violation. Thls is particularly true
because the rlsk that the Agency will take an
enforcement actlon for mlnor vlolat ions IS mlnimal, whereas it IS much more likely to Invest
the tlme and resources to penalize slgnificant
v~olatlons.Therefore, even withou;: the added
shleld of privilege or Immunity statutes, companles with major violat~ons (or the potentral
thereof) have the most to galn from the audit
policy and its concomitant protections.57
Delineat~ng precisely what constitutes a
"slgnificant" economlc galn would remove the
Agencys discretion to differentiate between larger and smaller entitles that have cornrnitted vrs-

51. See rd. at 546; Elliott, supra note 49 at 14-15
(audit documents subject to public revlew "may provlde a
wealth of Information for env~ronmental organ~zations
and public Interest groups acting as private attorneys
general").
52. The vlolatlon must be present or demonstrably
lmmlnent, however, past v~olationsdo not suffice for
standing In citizen suits. See Steel Company v. Citizens for
a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), 1998 WL 8804
( U S . Ill) at '13-14 (1998).

some statutes, such as FIFRA, it IS unclear whether PEN
applies).
55 The QRT 1s comprised of members of each
malor media enforcement program, as well as the
Department of Justice and representative!; of each EPA
reglon. It IS chalred by the Office sf Regulatory
Enforcement withln the EPA Office sf Regulatory
Enforcement (OECA). The QRT's stated mission is to
"expeditiously, fairly, and consistently resolve nationally
slgnificant Issues lnvolvlng application of the audit policy
In specific cases." Audit Policy Update (EPA Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance), Jan. 1997 at 9.

scenario,

53. BEN IS a computer modeling method that estimates the economlc benefit gamed by a company through
its failure to comply with env~ronmental regulations.
Among the criteria used In maklng the determination are
the cost of obtalnlng the necessary permits; time spent
out of compliance; the requ~redcapital Investment; and
the Interest on capital gamed dur~ngnoncompliance. For
further Information on the BEN model, see EPA Office of
Compliance Assurance (OECA)website at (v~sitedMay 14,
1999) http://es.epa.gov/oecalmodels/ben.html.
54. See Wolf, supra note 29 at 545 (argu~ngthat with
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56. EPA has committed itself to conducting a follow-up study withln three years of the Ist;uance of the
Final Policy Statement to determine the policy's effectiveness. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at 66,706.
57 Thls 1s prov~ded.of course, that the agency correctly assesses the economlc benefit gainej through the
vlolation. If the EPA incorrectly assesses the benefit, the
cost to the vlolator could be much higher or lower
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lations, as well as among the v~olat~ons
themm~ghtmean nothlng
selves. A $10,000 v~olat~on
to a large oil company, but it would likely matter
a great deal to a small dry cleaner. The Agency
currently has discretion to cons~derthe ratio of
the cost of compliance to the envlronmental
benefivr~sk.Inslstlng that the Agency decree
exactly what constitutes a s~gnificantamount
would eliminate its flexibility In lndiv~dualcases,
while offerlng a benefit of questionable worth.
Furthermore, if EPA revealed the dollar
amount at whlch they would initlate enforcement, that would create a pernlclous reverse
Incentwe. Entities could break the law with relative Impunity as long as the~rtransgressions did
not brlng them the specified amount of economIC galn. That freedom to lnfract polnts to poor
strategy by the enforcing Agency. just as the
police do not publish the number of miles over
the posted speed limit at whrch they start ticketIng, so too would a parallel tactic prove counterproductive for EPA. It bears noting that though
the police do not state the~rpolicy for speeders.
people know that they will almost never get ticketed for small amounts over the speed limit.
Similarly, In the envlronmental arena, small vlolations are de facto tolerated, but the uncertainty
over when enforcement beglns helps to malntain
acceptable compliance levels.
Another problem with specifylng the precise
amount of the economlc galn that the Agency
would deem s~gnificantlies in the fact that dolng
so would come perilously close to a rule rather
than a policy.58 Setting a specific level of galn and
specifylng a preclse Agency response does far
more than merely suggest the policy that the

Agency mlght apply In an adjudication. It creates
a rule of conduct and sets a mandatory Agency
response. Consequently. definlng the precise
nature of a vtolation and mandating a particular
Agency response would probably requlre a rulemaking, rather than lust the Issuance of a gu~dance document-sSince it makes little sense from
an enforcement standpoint to attach a specific
dollar figure to '"slgnificant amount." it seems
wholly ill-adv~sedto force the Agency to lnstlgate
a rulemaklng on thls Issue.
The thud compla~nt.that without prlvilegrng
audit results. entitles performing self-audits
open themselves up to potentially damaglng tort
and citizen enforcement suits, demands a more
r~g~rous
Inquiry The predicate of thls critlc~sm
seems skewed The v~olation,not the self-audit,
creates grounds for clvil suit. A self-audit merely
bnngs the v~olationto light In a manner designed
to mitigate Agency enforcement.
We must assume that the entity believes that
the v~olationwill eventually come to light even
without an audit. If not, the entire argument over
whether to protect self-audits becomes moot
because there is no Incentive to perform one.&>
If
the regulated entity can v~olateenvlronmental
laws with ~mpunit):then it need not fear Agency
enforcement or citizen enforcement suts and
self-audits become pointless. Rather than audit
and potentially lose the economic benefits ansIng from its v~olat~ons.
the entity would more
likely continue to v~olateand thereby also continue reaplng the wlndfall profits Stemmlng from
its m~sconduct One can also lmaglne a cycle of
steadily worsening behavior whereby an entity
v~olatesto enormous financ~algaln. commrs-

58. Sa. e.g.. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young,
818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987)[disallowingFDApolicy defining maximum aflatoxin levels In food because the policy
was couched in mandatory terms and therefore had the
effect of a rule).
59. See 'id. at 945-48; U.S. Telephone Ass'n v Fed
Communications Comm'n. 28 E3d 1232. 1234 (D.C. Cir.
1994)(finding that FCC penalty schedule setting base forfeiture amounts for violations "does not fit the paradigm
of a policy statement").
60. Sa Dana, supra note 5, at 978 I%rporatlons
cannot be assumed to choose the mix of management
options that maxlmize environmental compliance and
well-being unless it is In their financial interest to do
SO."); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell. Cooperation and Constratnt

m tk Mdtm Co~oral~on
An Inquiry into the C a w of Corporatr
Imntaralrly, 73 T=G L REJ 477"479-92 119951
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61 But set ifl"rJlpbons Dmhtd Under lmmunlty Law
\ir@ufifHart Eluded Tms, 06Kn7tsAgret*DalIy Envrronment
Report, April 24, 1996 ldiscussmng how campantes cond u a ~ n gaudlts under shteld of the states new seIf-audit
law are turning up v~crlattensthat woutd have gone undetected by state regulat~rslIt beans natrng hcwever, that
state agencies do net have the resources or personneIbf
the federal EPA V~olationsthat may have escaped state
Inspectors may eventually have been caught at the federal level Or. the v~olattonsmtght eventlraIIy have led to an
illegal andror harmful release that would have rncuned
not lust the wrath of the Agenc): but a rash of atizen s ~ i t s
as well
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slons an audit to galn ~mmunityfor its past
act~ons,and then beg~nsthe cycle again, t h ~ s
t ~ m v~olat~ng
e
different laws.
Regulated entitles uncerta~nabout whether they are comply~ngwith env~ronmentallaws
must choose between two difficult alternatives:
( 1 ) gamble that EPA will not discover the v~olatron independently and Impose the full brunt
of the available economlc and possibly cnmlnal penalt~es;or (2) conduct a self-audit, disclose any v~olatlons,and reach a settlement
with the Agency. Thls course of actlon would
reduce economic penaltles62 and likely remove
the threat of crlmlnal prosecution as well.63
Once the vlolat~on stands revealed, the
v~olatormay find itself the target of prlvate c~vil
suits. Yet, to structure the audit policy so as to
sh~eldv~olatorsfrom c~vilsuits by grant~ng
lmmunity to and/or pr~vileglngthe results of
audits,64 seems counter to EPA's mandate to
protect the public and the env1ronment.65,For
an entity to complaln that the federal enforcement policy fails to sh~eldit from the compla~ntsof Injured parties (in tort suits) seems
ak~nto a cr~m~nal
grouslng because h ~ splea
barga~ndoes not protect him from clvil suits.
The fear that report~ngaudit results will
expose entitles to civil suit also seems overstated. Since tort suits requlre significant
harm, anyone who had experienced such harm
would undoubtedly seek to learn its cause and
at her
would have a great deal of ~nformat~on
disposal.66 Furthermore, prompt report~ngand
correct~onof a vrolat~onwould go far towards
mitlgatlng c~vil liability by elimlnatlng the

polnt source of any contam~natlonbefore it
causes harm or, at a mlnlmum, hefore it causes further harm.
Also, a recent Supreme Courl: declslon has
effect~vely elim~nated standing for citlzen
enforcement suits In cases where the government has taken an enforcement actton." The
Court held that neither vlndicat~onof the rule
of law without cogn~zableInjury, nor past illegal conduct, nor the unsubstantiated threat of
future Injury, sat~sfythe redressability requlrement for Art~cleIll standing.@
Citlzen enforcement suits rout~nelyseek to
penalize wrongdoers by seeklng sratutory damages. A successful citlzen suit therefore swells
the coffers of the federal treasury more than it
The Court's clarbenefits the citlzen lit~gant(s).
ificat~onof the redressability standard elimlnates standing In these 1nstances.69
Further, the illegal conduct presumably
ceases once an Agency enforcement actton
occurs. If so, there 1s no present or loom~ng
future Injury and therefore no standing.?"
Requlrlng that an entity disgorge the economIC benefit gamed through noncompliance (as
mandated by the audit policy) constitutes an
Agency enforcement actlon. Cor~sequently,if
an entity self-audits, discloses the results,
remedies the discovered vlolatlons, and then
pays the penalty mandated by the Agency, it
galns a sh~eldfrom citlzen suits. The Court's
clarification of the redressability standard
elim~natesstanding In these 1nstances.71
An lnterest~ngsituation may arise when
the economlc benefit from a v~olatlonIS ~nsuf-

62. See Sorenson, supra note 29 at 489.
63. See Audit Policy Update (EPA Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance), January 1997,
at 3 (noting that the declston not to charge at least three
companies with env~ronmentalcrlrnes arlslng from thelr
voluntary disclosure of v~olations,"stemmed from the
cons~derationsexpressly set forth In the Audit Policy.").
64, See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at
66,710 [outlining EPA's opposition to state laws that pnvilege the results of env~ronmentalaudits).

66. See. e.g.. the TOXIC
Release lnvenfory, available
online at, (last modified Mar. 31. 1998) <www.epa.gov/
env~ro/htrnl/tr~s/
tns-query-lava html, as well as the Information that would normally become available through
clvil discovery.
67 See. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 1998WL 8804 ( U S 111) at
13-14 (1998)("It 1s an Immense and unacceptable stretch
to call the presumption [of future injury1 Into service as a
substitute for the allegation of present or threatened
Injury upon whlch Initial standing must be based~")
68. See rd.
69. See rd.
70. See rd.
71. See rd.

65. See, e.g., rd. (purpose of the policy IS to "enhance
protection of human health and the environment by
encouraglng regulated entities to voluntarily discover,
disclose, correct and prevent v~olationsof federal envlronmental requ~rements").
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fic~entlylarge to merit an enforcement actlon.
Following an audit, a company m~ghtwlsh to
enter Into a settlement agreement with EPA,
despite the Agencys apparent lack of Interest,
in order to defuse the r~skof a citizen suit. The
Agency enforcement action would actually
work to the polluter's benefit by quashing the
deterrent power of a potent~alcitlzen enforcement suit.
Even assuming that the government
should lessen the potential liability of entities
through
that disclose and correct v~olat~ons
self-audits, the incentives offered In the Final
Policy Statement do just that. In addit~onto
the protection from cit~zenenforcement suits
gained vla Agency enforcement actlons, the
disAgency's mit~gatedresponse to v~olat~ons
covered through voluntary audits72 encourages
lndustr~es to periodically scrutinize the~r
behavlor. That scrutlny enables prompt discovery and remediatlon of current violat~onsas
well as the avoidance of potent~alfuture problems. Entitles can self-correct before the~r
actlons injure the public, thereby heading off
possible tort suits as well as creat~nga climate
of good will among the citlzenry.73
Lastly. concern about confident~alitydoes
not appear to play much of a role in Industry
decisions concerning self-audits.74 The
absence of protect~onfrom thlrd party suits
has not deterred Industry from self-audit~ng.A
1995 Price Waterhouse survey found that.
among the few large or m~d-s~zed
companies
that have elected not to self-audit, concern
about confident~alitywas not a s~gnificantfactor In the~rdeclslon.75 Their reasons were pnmarily economic.

72. Final Policy Statement. supra note 2, at 66,706
(summanzing incentives to self-audit).
73. Compare Gail S. Port, Does EPA Policy Ml/y Provide
Protection? NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, June 12. 1995 (public
interest groups that are unsatisfied with agency response
or the efforts to remedy the v~olationmay still elect to
sue. even after a company has voluntarily disclosed and
attempted to correct a vtolation). Suits can only be filed,
however. if the company's efforts to correct the problem
have failed.
74. See Testimony of Steven Herman, supra note 8,
("[Slu~eyson audit practices and our discussions with
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111. Privileges and Immunities

As mentioned above, despite EPKs efforts

to fash~onthe Final Policy Statement to meet
state concerns. many states remaln unsat~sfied
with the federal audit policy. Eighteen states
have passed laws grantlng vanous levels of evldentlary privilege to audit reports as well as In
some cases. allowlng immunity for the v~olator.
State audit statutes fall generally into two categories. (1) statutes offerlng a qualified pr~vitege
and no Immunity (most state statutes fall into
thls categoryj, and (2) statutes offering both a
qualified pr~vilegeand 1mmunity76Thls section
lo~ksat the legal and policy reasoning behlnd
an ev~dentiarypr~vilegeand immunity.
A. Privilege
Legislatures. both at the state and federal

level, can create new pr~vilegesthrough statute.
For the most part, however. Congress and the
state legislatures have been chary of shielding
Information from the ludicla1and admln~strative
process that the courts have not already shreided through common law ev~dentiaryprivilege.
According to Wigmore, four condit~onsmust be
met In order to lustify a ludicla1 privilege;
1 The communlcat~onsmust or1g1nate In a confidence that they they will not
be disclosed
2. Thls element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parttes.
3. The relation must be one whlch ln the
oplnlon of the community ought to be
sedulously fatertd.
stakeholders connnced us that any 'chilling effect' that
our enforcement pitctes had on self-audit~nghas been
more than offset by exrsttng Incentives to have a cornprehens~veaudttlng program "1
75 Sn Vofunlary Enuronmenla! Ault Survey of U S
Business, Pnce Waterhouse LLP (March 1W5j at 47 [hereInafter 'Price Waterhouse Survey'!, sst a h Rna! Poliq
Statement. supra nQte 2, at 66.710 fclttng survey as eiidence In apposltlon to state laws giantrng pr~vrIegeor
~mmunityl
76 SPr Sorenson, supra nate 29, at 491
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injury that would Inure to the
relat~onby the disclosure of the communlcatlon must be greater than the benefit thereby gamed for the correct disposal of the lit1gat1on.77

In declding whether to extend a privilege,
courts must balance the competing policy conslderatlons of complete disclosure of relevant
facts and the public Interest In malntalnlng the
confidentiality of certaln communlcat~ons.In
general, courts have shown a marked reluctance to create new pr1vileges.~8
There currently
exlst three ev~dentlaryprecedents for pnvileglng the results of audits: attorney-client prlvllege, self-critlcal analysis, and the work product
doctrine. As several commentators have shown,
none of these extant doctrines comfortably
encompass a proposed audit prlvilege.79

B. Immunity
Several state self-audit laws prov~deboth
clvil and cr~m~nal
Immunity to companies that
disclose v~olatlonsIn accordance with state
gu1delines.80 Without ~mmunity,even if the
evaluative lnformat~onof an audit were pr1v1leged, government lnvestlgators could use discovery to gain access to the factual lnformatlon
contamed In the audit. Cons~derthe Arkansas
prlvilege statute, if a state pollut~oncontrol
Agency has Independent lnformatlon glvlng it
probable cause to believe an env~ronmental
offens has been committed, it can obtaln a
copy of an audit report. (1) under a search warrant, (2) under a subpoena; or (3) through dis77 Wigmore. Ev~dence. 2285 (McNaughten rev.
1961 ) (emphas~sIn or~g~nal).
78. See Un~versityof Pennsylvan~av. EEOC. 493 U.S.
182, 189 (1990) (acknowledging that, while the Federal
Rules of Ev~dence"prov~dethe courts with flexibility to
develop rules of prlvilege on a case-by-case basts,
we
are dis~nclinedto exerclse thls authority expans~vely").
79. See Hunt & Wilk~ns,supra note 23, at 377-402;
Sorenson, supra note 29. at 490-500.
80. Those states are: Idaho, 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws.
359; Kansas, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 204; Minnesota, 1995
Minn. Laws 168;Texas, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 219; Virg~n~a,
Va. Code Ann. Q 10.1-1 198 (1995); and Wyom~ng,Wyo.
Stat. QQ 35-1 1-1 105. 1106 (Mitchle 1998). It bears noting,
however, that Idaho's law sunsets In 1998 and the governor has recently agreed not to seek its renewal. Telephone
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covery.81 If the Agency uncovers evldence of a
v~olatlonit can seek penalt~es.
By contrast, Immunity statutes provide
auditlng entitles with complete protection from
penalty. For example, Wyornlng's statute states,
"If an owner or operator of a facility regulated
under thls act voluntarily reports tc the departthe
ment a vlolat~ondisclosed by the audit
department shall not seek c~vilpenalties or
~njunctlverelief for the v~olat~on
reported
"82
The law goes on to list four caveats, excluding
from Immunity vlolat~onswhere:
i) the facility

under ~nvest~gatlon
for
of thls act at the time the
any v~olat~on
vlolat~onIS reported;
(ii) the owner or operator does not take
actlon to eliminate the v~olat~on
withln
the tlme frame specified In an order
affirmed by the council or otherwise
made final pursuant to W.S. 35-1 1701(c)(ii);
(iii) the v~olat~on
IS the result of gross
negligence or recklessness; or
(iv) the department has assurrled prlmacy over a federally delegated envlronmental law and a warver of penalty
authority would result In a st;'te program less str~ngentthan the federal
program or the walver would v~olate
any federal rule or regulat~onrequrred
to malntaln state prlmacy.83
IS

Other state laws vary In language and s ~ o p e , ~ 4
but all offer some form of Immunity from civil
l n t e ~ ~ ewith
w Br~anRiedel, U.S EPA, Vice Char (Office of
Plann~ngand Policy Analys~s),Office of Enforcement and
Compliance & Editor, EPA Audit Policy Update (April 5
1997) lhere~nafterRiedel I n t e ~ ~ e wInl , adclition, BPA is
currently negotiating with Texas to remove the criminal
Immunity provlslon from its audit law Id.

81. See ARK.CODEANN.Q 8-1-309(a) (Ivlitchie 1907)
(proceeding to obta~nenv~ronmentalaudit leport)
82. WYO.STAT.
ANN.4 35-1 1-1 106 (a) (PAitchie 1997).
83. Id.
84. Minnesota's law, for example, institutes a pilot
program forvoluntary compliance. Participation is limited
to regulated entities that have not been the subiect of an
enforcement action resulting In a penalty for at least one
year prevlous to the~renrollment. See 1995 Mlnn. Law 168
§§ 8. 10.
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and/or cr~mlnalprosecut~onto companies that
In compliance with the
disclose v~olat~ons
statutory gu~delines.
Grantlng statutory Immunity to entitles
that voluntarily disclose v~olat~ons
ralses many
s~milar policy Issues to audit prlvilege.
Immunity allows polluters to benefit from the~r
mlsdeeds without fear of prosecut1on.85while
creatlng the potentla1 for uneven enforcement.86 In a state with a prlvilege and rmmunlty reglme an entity could disclose and remedy
it discovered
only one of the several v~olat~ons
durlng an audit. It would galn Immunity from
any penalty for that v~olationwhile keeplng the
rest of the audit lnformat~onprivileged. In thls
way the entity would look like a good corporate
cit~zenwhile contlnulng to reap the benefits of
its remalnlng vlolat~ons.By contrast, an entity
In a state without a pr~vilegeandlor Immunity
statute would have to disclose the full results
of any audits and face any penalt~esarlslng
from all the v~olat~ons
discovered durlng the
audit process.
Further, by maklng it more attractive to correct noncompliance, audit Immunity dimin~shes corporate lncentlve to prevznt noncompliance In the first place.87 Since corporat~ons
earn a return on all current assets, they would
clearly prefer to defer low-return expenditures
like pollut~ontechnology for as long as posslble. Without Immunity, a company cons~derlng
delaylng its Investment In pollut~oncontrol
technology must we~gh:(1) the rlsk of substant ~ a economrc
l
and gravity-based penalties if it
gets caught, and (2) the costs of disgorging its
economlc galns and Installing new technology
at potent~allyh~gberprices (if it audits and diswith the Intent of remedycloses the v~olat~on
lng the problem).
85. See Testimony of Steven Herman, supra note 8
TestiFylng agalnst a proposed ~rnrnunityprovlslon at the
federal level. Herman noted that 'the penalty lrnmunity
provlslon m the bill glves v~olatorsan economlc advantage over the~rlaw-ab~dingcompetitors. lTlo maintam
a level playlng field. the federal and state governments
must be able to recoup the economlc benefit of vlolations--even Inadvertent ones that are discovered voluntarily." Id.
86. See Intenrn Policy Statement. suprir note I. at
16.878.
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Compan~esrestding In states with Immunlty statutes no longer need worry about relinqulshlng the economlc benefits gamed
through noncompliance. They must only
assess the odds ~f gettlng caught before conducting an audit against the substant~alwindfall they stand to reap through noncompliance
coupled with the Immunity they stand to gain
through the~reventual audit Assurnlng the
ex~stenceof an immunity statute and given the
dwindling government resources devoted to
environmental enforcement. engagtng In a
cycle of vl~latlonand compiiance audits rather
than invest~ngIn prevention appears to make
good economlc sense.@Given thrs counterproductive effect on pollution control, the adursability of ~mmunitystatutes bears serlous
reevaluation.s2
N. Is EPA Policy on Self-Audits A Rule in
DIsgufse?

One of the malor complarnts leveled by
Industry at EPKs audit policy was that it rs
actually a disguised rule that should have
undergone an APA rulemaking procedurel"'
According to critics. the audit policy delineates
the Agency's enforcement response to envlrnrnmental v~olat~ons
with such certarnty that it
should be sublect to a rulemak~ngas required
by the APAq1
Thls section examlnes the differences
behveen polic~esand rules under the APA, and
as Interpreted by the courts It then analyzes the
audit policy to determine whether lt should
have been Issued as a mPe The anakysls concludes by finding the audit poiicy a valid statement of policy. not In need of an APA rulemak1%

87

Set Dana, supra note 5, at 979-91

far a full ~ISCUSSIOII~f t h e ec~~nomlcs
of
prevention. tnactton, or aud~trngunder an ~mrnunir;
framework
89 3 r d
90 Set Rtedel I n t e ~ i esupra
~ , n 3 t e ?(s ldiscuisirrg
the feedbackcolleded by the agencj dunng the csmrn5nt
period eitxeen pubitcatten at t h e Interim and F i n d
Pallc,l Staternentsj. sa a h Ftnal PoIry Statement, rurm
note 2, at 66,7113
88

Set ~d
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A. Rules vs. Policy Under the Administrative
Procedure Act
Rules are Agency-made laws.92 Agencles
cannot pass rules unless author~zedby statute.
But, so long as a rule does not exceed the
Agency's statutory authority (including the
APA), it IS enforceable as law. Further, unlike the
leglslat~vebrapch of the government, agencles
are not constrained by the separation of powers
doctrine. Withln the limits of the~rmandate, the
APA, and due process, agencies make, enforce,
and adjudicate laws.93 Because agencles wleld
such power, the APA requlres that Agency-made
rules undergo a revlew process, including publishlng the proposed rule In the Federal
Reg~ster?~
lnvitlng public comment,g5composIng a mandatory Agency response to those comments,96 and allowing the opportunity for judic~alrev1ew.97Policies, on the other hand, do not
formally bind agencles or regulated entitles and
therefore requlre no formal revlew process.
Consequently, In matters where the Agency
wishes to allow both itself and its constituents
latitude, polic~escan prove more efficient and
expedient than rules.
Policies suggest the positlon the Agency
will likely take In an adjudication. Rather than
promulgat~ngspecific rules of conduct, policles
explaln the likely reactlon of the Agency to certam behavior. They are meant to gulde both the
Agency and its constituents In determ~nlnghow
the Agency will likely respond to certaln behavlor. Rules serve a slmilar fundlon; they do not
lock the Agency Into an enforcement strategy
slnce any such actlons are taken at the discretlon of the Agency. However, a rule would establish a b~ndingset of criterla that must be met
before ~nitlatlng enforcement. The decislon

whether to enforce, if the critc?rta are met,
belongs to the Agency.g8 But the criteria, once
promulgated In a rule, elim~natemuch of the
flexibility that would be available under a policy.
Because they do not legally blnd the
Agency or its regulated entitles, policies are
not subject to judicial revlew, The flexibility
offered by a policy may somettnies outwelgh
the increased force of law that Inheres In a rule.
The rulemaklng process may seem overly burdensome, and the constraints of a formal rule
may Inhibit the Agencys responsiveness. In
additron, the Agency may not feel entlrely
secure with its policy, and may wlsh to avoid
the scrutlny that accompan~esa formal rulemaklng.99
Since agencles control actlvit~esand dispense items of great value (e.g., licenses, food
stamps, health care), a statement of the
Agencys positlon on a glven Issue can have a
profound Impact upon regulated entitles.
Those who cannot afford to displease the entity that controls thelr livelihood will likely
change thelr behavlor to meet Agency guidelines. Consequently, In practice, the line
between a rule, whlch mandates c3rtaln behavlor, and a policy, wh~ch"suggests" behavtor
while relying on the threat of Agency actlon for
emphas~s,can become quite blurr.ed.ioo
Indeed, a key reason that agencies often
prefer policles IS that the confus~onover how
to distinguish a policy from a rule has led to
considerable judic~al deference for Agency
actions. Polic~escurrently recelve the deferent ~ a l"arbitrary and capr~clous"standard of
revlew that courts once reserved for leglslat~ve
rules.~0~
Th~sallows agencles.to make b~nding
pronouncements without subject~ngthose pro-

92. See Immigration and Naturalization Sew. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (acknowledging that agencymade rules are laws enforceable in the same manner as
those made by Congress).
93 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. G William T. Mayton,
Administrative Law. Q 4.1 ( 1993).
94. See 5 U.S.C. Q 553(b) (1994).
95 See 5 U.S.C. Q 553(c) (1994).
96 See ld.
97 See 5 U.S.C. Q 553 (1994); see also Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC. 435 U.S. 519 541-50

(1978) (establishing procedural requirements for rule-
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making; agencies may, at their discretiorl, impose addltional requirements, but the courts may not do so]
98. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S EZ1.831 (1985).
99. See Aman G Mayton. supra note 03, at 3 4 0.
100. See id at Q 4 2.2; see also Robert A Anthony,
"Interpretive" Rilles, "Legalalive" Rules and 'Spurious" Rulrs.
Lilting the Smog, 8 ADMIN.
L I. AM U. I . 9, (!specially n 29
(1994) (analyzing and classifying the binding effects of
various agency documents)
101. See APA. 5 U.S C. Q 706(2) (1994) ('The revlewing court shall
hold unlawful and set aside agency
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nouncements to the scrutiny of a rulemaking.102
Free from the pressure that the public and
industry can brlng to bear, an Agency can effectively operate by fiat rather than with the oversight mandated by the APA.103
In a number of cases, the courts have found
that policy statements by agencies amounted
to rules in disguise.104 At other times they have
upheld the Agency's policy guidelines as appropriate. In Iowa power & Lrght Co. v. Burlington
Northern, Inc.,lo5 for example, the Eighth Circuit
held that the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) practlce of determining the reasonableness of the contracts between railroads and
shippers on a case-by-case basis amounted to
a policy rather than a rule. The railroads had
claimed that the policy bound the Agency to a
specific code of behavlor and should therefore
have been set down for a rulemaking. The court
disagreed, finding that the policy did not establish a binding- legal norm for all contractual
arrangements. Instead, it left the Agency free to
"exercise considerable discretion" when evalu-

ating individual cases,PM Rather than setting
down the substance of Agency determinations.
the policy instead referred t o the form by wh~ch
those determinations would be made. The
court found that form without substance did
not amount to a rule. and therefore did not warrant the railroad's participation in its formulation 1G7
The D C. Circuit used similar reasoning rn
National Latino Media Coalition v Federal Communications Commlrnon.1C*The FCC released a written
announcement stating that it mntended t o canduct a lottery to determine whlch of the many
equally qualified applicants would receive an
FCC license The court concluded that the
announcement was a policy rather than a rule,
stating: 'These statements merely present an
interpretation of the Agency s governing
statute. They d~ not bind the Commrssron ever
to conduct a tie-breaker Iottery.""'i

arbitraw
action, findings and conclus~onsfound to be
capnclous, an abuse of discretion
"). Id. Courts have
also applied thls standard to policy statements; set, e.g ,
Bechtel v. FCC. 10 E3d 875. 877 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Capital
Network Sys. v. FCC. 3 E3d 1526, 1530 [D.C. Cir. 19931;
Amencan Trudung Ass'n v. United States. 755 F.2d 1292,
1299 (7th Cir. 1985).
102. See Richard I. Pierce, lr., Sewn \Vays to Dsssify
Agency Rulemaking. ~ ~ A D M L.
I NREV.
. 59 [1995)(argu~ngthat
courts accord greater deference to policy statements and
Interpretative rules than to leg~slativerules and that polrcy statements often blnd judges to the same extent as do
rules). Professor Pierce analyzes Stinson v. United States.
508 U.S. 36 (1993)and Williams v. United States, 503 U S
193 (1992). both of which lnvolved Interpretive rules
rather than policy statements. Though Professor Pierce's
analysls seems to conflate Interpretive rules and policy
statements, he IS correct In o b s e ~ l n gthat the Court
seems to merge the two as well. He uses the aforementioned declslons to demonstrate how the Court has mandated significant ludicla1 deference to both policres and
rnterpretive rules. In Stimon. for example. whlch rev~ewed
Sentenung Comm~ss~on
leg~slatlve documents rather
than policy statements. the Court declared that [tlhe
pnnc~plethat the Guidelines Manual 1s blnding on federal courts applies as well to policy statements." SIin:on, 508
U.S. at 42.

States, 316 U S 407 (1442) In this farnaws"C6Scase t h 2
Supreme Court held that the FCC s announced disfavor csf
certaln contractual relatronshrps GeP~eenIs,zaI and network radio statrons amounted to a poIrc; rather than a
rule. United States Tel Ass n v Federal Communlcattona
Comm'n. 28 F3d 1232 (DC Crr D994j (penaItj schedule
promulgated by FCC ameunted t~ a 'ruk rn masquerade
and was therefore subiect fs a fomnl ruiernak~ngi
Chamber af C~rnmercev QSHA 636 F26 46-4 IDC Clr
19801 lOSHRs announcement that ernp!qers fa~lrrreto
pay empfoyees br ssc;mpaw;rng agsnq Inspector on
'walkaraund mspearons l ~ ~ he~ proserured
[ J
as 613cnmlnatron amounted to a m!e an2 must therefore
undergo a formal mlem3ksngj
105 Set Isxa Prxer G Ltght CQ ", Burirngtisn
Nsrthern. Ins &rJ7F2d 7% 18th Crr lo81 r itrt dtnrtd. 455
U S 907 W 19824

103. See Robert A Anthony & Davld h Codevilla,
Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at Agmcy Pdicy SLaI~ntslls,3 I
WAKE
FOREST
L. REV.667.669 (1996).
104. See, e.g.. Columbla Broadcasting Sys. v. United

I07 SPt td Far a g53d ~ C S C U S S F DofR tbls case as
well a s the p@ltcyCruIedrrhatamg. see. Wlllfarn T Maytors
The Concept cf a Ruk a d the ,SuE;tan!wf [rnpJst TtTt m
Rufemnkrng 33 Eg':::;, L I 889. 918 11984fl
108 Natron~l Latrns ?.!eJ13 Canlltrcm v Federal
Cornmunlcstrons Comm n. $16 F2d 185 I D C C!r 19871
109 Set ~d at 787
118 Id at 789 For further drsussctn af thrs an5
related cases see Paul N Rechenberg Note king Tk
B3llte On Obxenrly. But Cun lVe Ufln Tht Uru@ The NatronaI
Bdmment For The A& Frgf~lAgclrmt Fundrng 06;cene Arttitli
\ifffrkr. 57 h!C!a RE5 299 31 1 119921
- -
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B. Tests for Determining Whether a Policy IS
Actually a Rule
THOtests have emerged for determlnlng
whether an Agency dictate amounts to a policy
or a rule: the "Force of Law" test and the
"Substant~alImpact" test."' The Force of Law
test looks at the legal Impact of the Agency
act~on.Under thls test, the policy statement
has the force of law if both the Agency and its
regulated entitles behave as if the Agency
requlres adherence to its stated posit~on.If so,
the policy IS actually a disgu~sedrule.and sublect to a rulemak1ng.1'2The Substantial Impact
test IS less formalist. It looks to whether the
Agency actlon causes "palpable effects" to regulated entities and the general public. If so,
then the actron must undergo the scrutlny and
public comment that accompanles a rulemaklng procedure.113 Under either test, the audit
policy does not qualify as a rule.
1 Force of Law Test
The Force of Law test has two prerequlsites. First, Congress must formally grant a
rulemaklng power to an Agency.lI4Rulemaklng
power accompanles any delegation of substantlve power by Congress to an Agency, although
the parameters of the rulemaklng power may
vary from statute to statute.l15 For example,
Congress may delegate authority to EPA to
enforce the Clean Air Act but reserve for itself
the r~ghtto determine emlsslons standards for
carbon monox~defor new cars. Whereas, In the
Clean Water Act, Congress may glve EPA full
authority to set effluent quality standards In
every area.
Second, the proposed rule must derlve its
authority from the statute that the Agency IS
~mplementlng.To show an illegal act by a regulated entity, the Agency need only show a VIOlat~onof the rule, rather than a v~olat~on
of the
statute. In other words, statutes lay out broad
IlI.

See Aman & Mayton, supra note 93, a t

Q 4.3.

112. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co, v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 506 E2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
113. See National Helium Corp. v. Federal Energy
Admln.. 569 E2d 1137 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977).
114. See, e.g.. Amerlcan Postal Workers U n ~ o nv.

Heinonline

--

parameters and goals, instruct~ngagencles to
adopt rules which then fill in the gaps, specifylng wh~chbehav~ordoes and does not conform
with the law. Reasonrng syllog~st~cally,
if a rule
specifies how to obey a law, and an entity v~olates the rule, then the entity must have vlolated the law as well.
The leading case for the I:orce of Law
approach IS Pacific Gas & Electnc Co v. Ft9deral
Power Commaslon.~6In upholdirrg the Power
Comm~ss~on's
use of a policy statement rather '
than a rule to announce its methodology for
curtailing natural gas usage durrng times of
shortage, the D.C. Circuit found that the
Comm~ss~on
had merely announced the policy
it would use In subsequent adjudicat~crns,
rather than creating a blanket rule The apln~on
la~dout the difference between :I policy and a
rule as follows:
In
adrn~n~strative
proceedings
lnvolvlng a substantwe rule, !:he Issues
are whether the adjudicated facts conform to the rule and whether the rule
should be wa~vedor ppplied In that
particular Instance.
***
A general statement of policy on the
other hand, does not establish a "blndlng norm."
[Tlhe Agency cannot
apply or rely on a general statement of
IWlhen the Agency
policy as law.
applies the policy In a particular situatlon, it must be prepared to support
the policy lust as if the policy statement had never been 1ssued.~l7
Though the Power Comm~s.s~on's
policy
effect~velyforced many natural gas users to
begln an immediate search for alternative
energy sources, the court nonetheless found
had been Issued as a
that, slnce the dec~s~on
United States Postal Serv 707 E2d 543, 558 ( D C Clr
1983). cert. denred. 465 U S. 1 100 ( 1984)
115. SeeMortonv.Rulz.415US 109 231 (1974)
116. See Pacific Gas & Elec Co v Federal Power
Comm'n. 506 E2d 33 (DC. Cir 1974).
1 17. Id a t 38-39.
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policy statement, it lacked the "force of law""8
and therefore could not possibly have been
enforced as such. The tautology embedded In
thls reasoning (a policy cannot have the force of
a rule because policles lack the force of rules)
has not been lost on the courts, including the
D.C. Circuit in later decls1ons.fl9While no brnding precedent exists dictating the proper test for
determlning whether a policy is In fact a rule In
disguise, recent years have witnessed a drift
away from the Force of Law test and toward the
Substantral Effects test.120
2. Applying the Force of Law Test fo the
Audit Policy

Though courts have applied the Force of
Law test less frequently in recent years, the test
has not been categorically discarded. Furthermore, there remarns no consensus as to the
best method for distlngu~shingrules from poliaes. It will therefore prove instructive for both
legal and analytrcal reasons to apply the test to
the federal audit policy.
A rule dictates behavior, either of the regulated entity or the regulating Agency. By contrast, a policy offers guidance while binding nerther s~de.The key determrnatlve factors In the
Force of Law test involve whether: (1) the policy
statement establishes a "blnding norm;"i*1 and
(2) whether the Agency relies on the policy as a
general statement of la\v.lu Then, to qualify as
a policy rather than a rule, the Agency must (3)
"be prepared to support the policy just as if the
policy statement had never been issued."~23
1 18. See id. at 4 1.

119. See. e.g.. Community Nutrition lnst v. l'oung,
818 E2d 943, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("IAlctionlevels' established by the FDA for contamfnants In food amounted to
a rule rather than policy because the agency guidelines
'set a preclse level of
contamination that the FDA
deems perrnlssible.").
120. See Aman & Mayton, supril note 93, at Q 4 3
(noting that slnce the early seventies, courts have begun
to turn away from the "facile semantic distlnct~ons-of the
force of law approach).
121. See Pacific Gas & Elec Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33. 49 [D.C. Cir. 1974); sc2 aka United
States Telephone v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 28
F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
122. See Pacific Gas & Elec Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n. 506 E2d 33.49 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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it seems doubtful that the audit policy creates a blnding norm. The text of the Final Policy
Statement expressly declines to blnd affected
parties.1z4 though it does spell out with some
specificity the partrcular procedures for voluntary disclosure of environmental v~olationsin
order to lessen the Agency's enforcement
resp0nse.12~Nonetheless, neither the Final
Policy Statement nor the lnter~m Policy
demands specific behavlor from regulated enttties, The declsron to self-audit IS entlrely voluntary. Thls poses a stark contrast to the exampIes
offered by Professor Anthony wherein the
Agency attempted to use policy statements to
dictate the behawor of regulated enttt1es.r26
The audit policy also leaves room for
Agency discret~on As noted earlier, EPA can
decline to seek restrtution depending on the
amount of economlc benefit der~vedfrom a partlcular vrolat~on It thus remains an open
questlon as to whether the policy creates a
"binding norm" even with respect to Agency
behavr~r.
Some critics and state legislatures contend
that the audit policy blnds states, preventing
them from uslng therr own methods for envrronmental enforcement. They pcrlnt to the
Agency's stated opposition to state laws granting privilege and Immunrty to violators 12%They
reason that if the Agency can threaten to disapprove a State implementatron Plan (SIPj for
enforcrng federal environmental law by ailegrng
~ncompatibilitywith the audit policy. then the
audit policy must have the force of law. Th~s

"'

123 11
124 Flnal P s l t g Statement suprrl nzte 2 at 66 712
[The po11c-yis not a frnsl agenzy 'ictrsrr and 1s rntended
as guidance It d s e s m2a create any rights dutres oblrgatlons or defenses trnpfred or atherktse in an) thrrd parties ' j
125 SPt Ftnad Partg Staternen! supril note 2 at
66,711 and accamp3nyrng text
126 Spr Cammunay Nutrition fnsl v Young 818
F2d 943 I D C Cmr 1981)
127 F~nalPaEtg Statement supra ngte 2 at 64 707
128 Ftnal Palre; Statement supra note 2 at 66 7E2
("EPA remains f~mly
oppssed to statutoty environrnentai
audlt pr~vrlegesthat sh~efde-rrcfenceaf environmental
*~~olations as well as to 61anket rrnmuntties far vroIatmns
I
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argument has merit, but close exam~natlon
reveals that the Final Policy Statement leaves
cons~derableroom for state statutory discretlon.
EPA has not objected to the majority of
state statutes that allow some form of prlvllege and/or Immunity, and In other cases has
merely asked for clarification from the states'
attorneys general.l29Addit1onally,if the test for
determining whether a policy IS actually a camouflaged rule lies In whether the Agency can
"support the policy lust as if the policy statement had never been 1ssued,"l30 then one
could convlnc~nglyargue that it IS not the
audit policy but the federal statutes themselves that vo~d state laws that Impede
enforcement. EPA need not rely on the audit
policy to nullify a SIP Indeed, slnce the audit
policy IS not a rule, it lacks the statutory
authority to do so. To vo~da SIP, the Agency
must show that a particular state law creat~ng
an ev~dent~ary
privilege and/or Immunity for
v~olatorsInterferes with the effic~entenforcement of federal law.
The audit policy sat~sfiesthe second prong
of the analysls In that EPA relies on it as a
statement of law. The policy outlines the
discovered
Agency's response to v~olat~ons
through self-audits131 and the Agency acknowledges that the policy sets "mln~rnumstatutory
gu1delines."l32 As one Agency offic~alnoted,
"Practically speaking, we're applylng it like a
rule."l33
Regarding the thlrd quest~on,
whether EPA
can, when enforcing the policy, support it just
as if the policy statement had never been
issued, the answer appears to be yes. Since the
policy blnds no one but EPA, the Agency need
only justify its own actlons. The actlons at

Issue ~nvolve a mit~gated enforcement
response to a voluntary disclosure of a vlolatlon. Under any c~rcumstances,the Agency
would w~shto encourage volunta~ydisclosure
and remediat~on.It would not recqulre a published policy to lustify a mitigated response
Intended to ach~evethat a1m.134 By t h ~ sreasonlng, the Agency gurdance more resembles a
policy than a rule.
In the final analysls, the audit policy withstands the Force of Law test. First, the policy
may or may not create a blnding norm. Even if
it did, it would blnd the Agency alone, and only
In the sense that it st~pulatescerta~nAgency
responses to voluntary behav~or07 the part of
regulated entitles. Second, EPA apparently
relies on the audit policy as a statement of law,
thereby suggesting a rule rather than a policy.
Thlrd, the Agency can support its policy as if
the policy statement had never been Issued.
The audit policy likely clears the first hurdle, stumbles on the second, and clears the
th~rd.Since all three component.; are necessary for a policy to have the force of law, the
audit policy lacks the force of law
Consequently, under the Force of Law standard, a rulemaklng IS not necessary.
3. Substantial EffectsTest
The Substantla1 Effects test looks less at
the letter of the Agency dictate than at its
Impact. In deading whether a policy has a substant~aleffect and should therefore be a rule,
courts use a two-pronged analys~:;.First they
look to whether the purported policy imposes
any r~ghtsor obligat~ons upon the public.
Second, they attempt to determ~newhether
the policy limits an Agency's discret~onIn later
determlnatlons.135

129. See State Immunity, Privilege Laws Examwed for
132. See Herman, supra note 5
Conflicts Affecting Delegated Programs. DAILYENVIRONMENT 133. See Riedel. supra note 80.
REPORT, Sep. 18, 1996, availa6le a LEXIS, BNA Library,
134. See also Chevron. U.S A Inc v. Natural
BNAED file (finding that "most states with audit laws are
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U S.(137 844 ( I 984)
faclng no threat to t h e ~ federally
r
delegated envrronmen(agency ~nterpretationsof statutes deserve great judicial
tal programs" and that often, letters of clarification from
deference
unless they are arbitrary or capnclous)
state attorneys general have lald EPA's concerns to rest).
135
See. e.g Alaska v. Department of Transp 868
130. See Pacific Gas G Elec. Co. v. Federal Power
E2d
441,
446-47
(D.C. Cir. 1989).American Hosp. Ass'n v.
Comm'n, 506 E2d 33.49 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Bowen, 834 E2d 1037 1046 (D.C. Cir 19871; Community
131. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2.
Nutrition Inst. if.
Young, 818 F2d 943.946 (43 C Cir 1987);
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The lodestar case for the Substantial
Effects test IS Community Nutrition Institute v.
Young.136 In Young, the D.C. Circuit held that the
"actlon levels" for allowable levels of aflatoxin
in foods set forth in a policy statement by the
Food and Drug Admlnistratlon (FDA) constituted a rule rather than a policy statement.
Consequently, the court found that the setting
of action levels required a rulemaking.
Under the FDA policy, producers who sold
food containing aflatoxln levels higher than
specified were subject to enforcement action.
Furthermore, the policy's language was stated
in mandatory terms: contaminants in excess of
the actlon levels "will be deemed to be adulterated."l37 In the court's view, the threat of enforcement created a new obligation for the public
while the mandatory nature of the policy language limited the FDA's discretion as to when
to initlate enforcement proceedings. Since the
FDA's actlon had a substantially similar effect
to a rule, it needed to undergo the rulemaklng
process.138
4. Applying the Subsfantial EffectsTest to

the Audit Policy
Apply~ng the two-pronged Substantial
Effects test to the audit policy y~eldsa similarly
mixed result to that In the Force of Law analysis. The first prong involves lnquirrng whether
the Agency statement Imposes any rlghts or
obligations upon the public. The second prong
requires assessing whether the policy improperly limits Agency discretion in later determinat1ons.139
As noted above, the audit policy does not
directly Impose obligations on the public.14o It
simply outlines the Agency's likely response to
voluntary actlons (self-audit and disclosure) by
regulated entitles. States are arguably burdened because the policy obstructs their ability
Amencan Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 E2d 525, 529
(D.C. Cir. 1980);see also Royal C . Gardner. Public Partic~pulion
and Wetlands Regulation, 10 UCLA J. E W ~ LL.. G Pa& 1, 10
(1991) (companng the substantial effects and force of law
tests).
136. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818
E2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
137. Id. at 947 (emphasis added).

to legislate privilege and immunity laws, Yet,
this is hardly a burden. SIPS enforce federal law
and are approved or disapproved at the discretlon of the federal government. It stands to reason that the federal Agency overseeing the SIP
should have the authority to determine if the
SIP IS being effectively administered If a states
laws Interfere with its obligations to cany out
federal law. then the burden on the state does
not derive from the audit policy but from federalism itself In other words, the only constraint
arislng from the audit policy IS one that already
existed; that states not pass laws that impede
the enforceability of federal statutes
The second question. whether the policy
improperly limits Agency discretion, rs slightly
more problemat~cThe policy does limit Agency
discretion by requiring it to forego seeking gravity-based penalties from qualifying entities.The
policy also prevents the Agency from recommending criminal prosecution based on audit
results 141 It remalns an open question, however. whether these limitations are improper. The
Agency has a clear policy goal of encouraging
self-audits and disclosure. The audit policy
accomplishes this goal without forfeiting EPKs
discretion with regard to serious violators or
those entitles that choose not to self-audit. The
only strictures placed on the Agency s behavror
concern specific mitigat~onmeasures for those
entitles that choose to audit.
Furthermore, even if the limitattons seem
severe. EPA could argue that they still are
appropriate As one Agency officra! noted, the
publication of the intertm and tinaE policy statements met all the APA procedural safeguards
fora rulemaking,!" including publicatron IR the
Federal Register and sohicitatl~nof public comment.143Neither of these steps ts required for
policles If EPA decides to issue the audit policy as a rule (which it reserves the right to do at
138

Set ril at 945-48

139

Set lif a1 946

140 Set Ftnal Palrsy Statement, supra n9te 124, at
66,712 and accompanying text
141
66,706
142

Stt F~nal Policy Statement, supra note 2, at

Rredel. supra note 79

143 SPr5USC $553119941
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revlslons to a SIP had the effect of "requlr~ngthe
a later date),la it would ~nvolvelittle more than
State
to follow EPA's current and future Interproposing the policy In the Federal Reg1~ter.I~~
pretations of the Act's provlslons
as well as
In light of these extraordinary lengths the
EPA's operating polic~esand guldance."149In the
Agency went to In formulating the policy, it
wake of protests and the commencement of litwould be difficult to argue that a few limits on
1gat1on.150EPA Issued a second Notlce of
Agency discret~onregarding response to a volClarificat1on151 declaring that ~nterpretatlons
untary disclosure from a regulated entity are
and gu~dancesdo not have the force d law and
~napproprlate.
The two components of the Substantla] that failureto obey them did not, In and of itself,
Effects test are whether a policy burdens the vlolate the Clean Alr Act.152
The second example lnvolved EPA agreeing
public and/or ~napproprlatelylimits Agency discretlon. The foregoing discuss~onhas shown to use a rulemaking to set emrssion standards
for new facilities or modificat~oriof exlstlng
that that the audit policy does neither and that
facilit~esIn reglons currently In conlpliance with
it consequently passes the Substantlal Effects
nat~onalalr quality standards. For years, EPA
test. Therefore, under either standard, Force of
Law or Substantlal Effects, the audit policy does had utilized a "bottom-up" appi-oach to its
requ~rement that emlsslons linlitat~ons be
not requlre a rulemaklng.
based on "best available control technology"
5. EPA Attempts to Legalafe Through
(BACT).153 BACT meant that the permitting
authority welghed several factors to determine
Policy Memoranda Have Decreased
EPA has, over the years, acqulred the repu- what technology was achievable and attanable
under the circumstances. Permittees need not
tatlon of a "champion In the game of 'rule by
memorandum."'~46Recently, though, the Agency
lnstall the most effectlve methods of em~ssion
has become more sensitlve to the differences control if they could demonstrate I hat its costs
between polic~es and rules. That sensitivity outwe~ghed its benefits. In 1987-88. some
arose of necessity, due to a growlng negatlve offices withln EPA began ~mplementlnga "tsppublic response to Agency attempts at govern- down" approach, requlrlng applicants to use the
most effectlve technology unless they ccluld
lng by policy statement. ~rofesiorRobert
show it to be Infeasible. In 1988, ElPA ~ssueda
Anthony polnts to two lnstructlve examples of
EPA ~nitiallyattempting to legislate through
memorandum statlng that those not uslng "toppolicy memoranda, then later agreelng either to
down" approach to BACT would be deemed perclarify its policy or to Issue a rule.147
mit deficient and potent~allysubject to enforceIn the first case, EPA stated In the preamble
ment act1on.15~
to its Not~ce of Clarification approving
Litlgatlcln ensued challenging ECPAs' authorKentucky's State Implementat~on Plan (SIP) ity to Implement the top-down aporoach withunder the Clean Alr Act148that EPA approval of
out gong through a leg~slatlverulemaklng.155 In
144. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at
66,710 ("[EPAI will cons~derthls issue and will prov~de
notice if it determines a rulemalung is appropriate.").
145. See Riedel lntervrew. supra note 80.
146. See Robert A. Anthony. Interpretive Rules, Policy
Stakmenls, Curdances. Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal
Agencres Use Them to Bind the Public?. 4 1 DUKE
L.J.131 1. 1346
(1992).
147

See id. at 1346-49.

148. Notification of Clarification, 54 Fed. Reg.
36,307 ( 1989).
149

See id. at 36,307-08.

150. Westvacov. EPA. No. 89-3975 (6th Cir. filed Oa.
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31, 1989).
151.

55 Fed Reg. 23,547-48 (1990)

152. 42 U.S.C. 4 7402 (1998)
153. 42 U.S.C. $4 7470-7479 ( 1998)

154. See Anthony, supra note 146, at 1349 n.221, cltIng Memorandum from Michael S Alu$hin, Associate
Enforcement Counsel for Air, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance hlonitoring, and john S Seitz, Director,
Stationary Source Compliance Divlsion, Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards, to varlous recipients (July
15, 1988).
155. The principal case in this dispute was
Amerlcan Paper Inst. v. Reilly, No. 89-2030 (D.DC filed
July 18, 1989).See Anthony, supra note 146, at 1389
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1991, EPA and the pla~ntiffssettled the suits.
EPA agreed to submit the BACT directive to a

formal rulemaking and acknowledged that the
"EPA BACT policy statement
IS not Intended
to create binding legal r~ghtsor obligations and
does not have the force and effect of law."l5Q
In both of the preceding examples, EPA
attempted to create a blnding Agency directive
without undergoing the proper rulemaking procedure.157 Each time, widespread protest and
the commencement of litigation forced the
Agency to reconsider. Taken together these
examples Indicate that EPA has, of necessity,
acquired an Increased sensitlvity to the need for
a rulemak~ngwhen the Agency expects expecting universal compliance with one of its directwes.158 It bears notlng, however, that t h ~ news
found sensitlvity came grudgingly, could be
episodic, and might well van~shwith the next
president~alelection.

V. ShouId the Audit Policy b e a Rule
Instead?

Though the audit policy IS not a rule In disthe question remalns whether it mlght
prove more effective and less controvers~alif it
were made into a rule. An audit rule would conclus~velyset forth EPA's position on what constitutes legal encouragement for entities that
w~shto audit. It would also reduce ambiguity
and rnlsunderstandings concerning possible
Agency reactions to audit results. States and
regulated entitles would enloy the security of
know~ngwith certa~ntywhat behav~orIS acceptable.
These proposed benefits to an audit rule,
however, could just as easily be viewed as detrlments. Specifying the parameters on state audit
laws removes a great deal of the states' discretion In enforcing federal env~ronmentallaws.
Even if the rule were flexible, it would still create
constralnts, otherw~seit would offer no greater
guise,

156. Anthony. supra note 146, at 1389, quoting settlement agreement for cases cited above, suprd note 12%
(July9 and 10. 1991).
157 The procedure for rulemalung In most cases 1s
set forth In the APA, 5 U.S.C. Q 553 (1994).The Clean iilr
Act, however, has its own rulemalung procedure. which IS
untethered to the APA See 42 U.S.C. $7607(d) (1994)
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clarity than a policy while offer~nga greater
threat of enforcement Under the current policy*
EPA can negot~atewith states regarding the
scope and Impact ~f state statutes If the policy
were a rule, it wouPd mandate a particular
Agency response ( i e ,suspending a state3 ability to ~mplernentits SIP) if a glven state law did
not conform to the rule3 specificat~ons
Currentlywboth states and EPA have the flexibility to craft agreements that may not necessarily
conform to a rlg~d~nterpretatlonof the policy
Often the negot~atlsnsleading to such agreements dispel any cloud of Agency disapproval If
the poliq~\trere
a rule, that flexibility would Iikely disappear Citlzens"roups would file suit to
force the rule"s enforcement and the Agency
would have no ch01ce but to adhere str~ctPyto
the letter of the law
Perhaps the most important constituency tn
the rulefpolicy debate IS the regulated community, Yet, even here, the choice between a rule
and a policy offers no clearly supenor option If
the audit policy were a rule, it u?ould present
clearly delineated dictates that an entity could
follo\t1,or disregard at its peril The enttty could
also challenge the rule In court, an option that
presents cons~derabtyfewer complicat~onsthan
challeng~nga policy ' 4 4
A rule deslgnatlng critec~afor enforcement
act~ons\vould create the potentmi tot volurnrnous litlgatlon The affected entrty could Iitrgate whether it has met every cctterron for ttrggerrng an enforcement actton For exampIe, if
the Agency dectded to seek gravtty-based
penalties from an entity under the current polICY reglme, the entity could nat challenge tts
dec~s~on
based on a supposed tack sf adherence t~ the audit policy If the policy were a
rule. however. the entity could Eitrgate rts noncompliance \v~theach of the nine delineated
factors before paying the penalty Thts opportunity to lit~gatethe rnechanlcs of the rule's
enforcement would arguabIy benefit the regwI58

SEr ,%-tthsn.$ suprd note 146, at 1349

159 SPt Arrrhar; :upm nzte 100 and arz~mpanping
t e ~ tidlscusstng nebulous standards presented 6;. the
Farce a1 L5'x and Su'tisrantr31Imp31 test1 W ~ t hrules, the
gu!delincs t;r rudtcral rc;ie.x are burlt ~ n the
t APA.
~
5
U S C $70.1 I 19911
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lated community. The torrent of litigation and
resulting ill will with the Agency could, however, also work to industry's detriment.
Furthermore, for entitles, just as for states,
the clarity offered by a rule comes with a prtce.
Just as clothlng labeled "one slze fits all" fits no
one particularly well, so too does a rule
deslgned for universal applicability lose its
ability to customize itself to suit a particular
entity. Lastly, regulated entitles, like state and
federal agenaes, might find themselves the
target of cit~zenenforcement suits designed to
force the rule's enforcement. That could result
In unnecessary enforcement actlons and/or
needless expenditures of tlme and resources In
litlgat~on.

3
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Second, though In some respects the audit
policy sk~rtsdangerously close to a disgu~sed
rule, it does not require a rulemaklng under
either the Force of Law or the substantial
Effects tests. The judicial standard for determlnlng a rule from a policy remalns ambiguously drawn. Nonetheless, glven that the audit
policy merely sets forth guidelines for Agency
response to voluntary behavlor from the regulated sector, and since the Final Policy
Statement was Issued after exte!nsrve public
comment and debate, thls does not appear to
be an example of the Agency governrng by pol~ c yrather than by APA approved rules.
Lastly, while rules offer clarity, they also
dimlnlsh flexibility on all sides while Inereaslng the likelihood of lit~gat~on.
The advantages
offered
to
states
and
the
regulated
community
VI. Conclusion
do not appear to outwe~ghthe potential detrlments. Probably the most important indicator
Sound policy reasons exlst for an audit
policy that encourages self-audits and volun- of the appropriateness of a policy rather than a
rule IS that no state or regulated entity has
tary disclosure. EPA's audit policy adequately
challenged the policy's validity or clalmed that
meets those needs. State laws seeking to
strengthen the allure of self audits by pr~vileg- it IS a rule In disguise. Instead, statist~csshow
an lncreaslng amount of self-auclits and conIng audit results and/or lmrnun~zingthe violator seem gratuitous and potentially detrimen- formity with the audit policy even though the
majority of states have declined to create a
tal. There exlsts no evldence to suggest that
statutory prlvilege or Immunity for auditors.
the federal policy's lack of privilege or immunity has deterred Industry from auditing, or v~o- Furthermore, most of the states :hat do have
prlvilege or immunity statutes hate negotiated
lators from coming forward. Furthermore,
the statutes' parameters with EPA and do not
grantlng prlvilege or immunity to violators
fear Agency reprisal.
allows an unfalr advantage over lndustrles that
The policy works; a rule may not work as
comply with environmental laws.
well. Why disturb a good thlng?
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